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ABSTRACT
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus is an established nosocomial pathogen (HA-MRSA, hos-
pital acquired MRSA), but has recently begun to appear in the community (CA-MRSA, community 
acquired MRSA). The cause of resistance to methicillin and all other β-lactam antibiotics is the mecA 
gene, which is situated on a mobile genetic element, the Staphylococcal Cassette Chromosome mec 
(SCCmec). Seven major variants of SCCmec, type I to VII are distinguished. HA-MRSA disseminated 
worldwide and causes the majority of S. aureus nosocomial infections with a limited number of 
clones disseminated including the Brazilian Epidemic Clone (BEC, ST239-MRSA-III). CA-MRSA 
isolates are susceptible to non-β-lactam antibiotics, usually isolated from healthy individuals which 
do not possess any unknown risk factors for MRSA infection and are associated with a larger clonal 
diversity compared with HA-MRSA. However, during recent years distinction between HA-MRSA 
and CA-MRSA is beginning to fade. Actually, knowledge about MRSA disseminating clones is re-
quired to implement any strategies to control the transmission of MRSA either within hospitals or 
in community. For this reason, rapid identification of strains is an important issue. The rate of HA-
MRSA can be reduced substantially through the implementation of interventions strategies, even 
in settings where MRSA is endemic as in most Brazilian hospitals. However, these policies could be 
quite complicated in the light of an increasing CA-MRSA prevalence in healthcare facilities, consid-
ering that distinction between HA-MRSA and CA-MRSA has started to disappear. 
Keywords: methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, community acquired methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus, nosocomial infections and community infections. 
[Braz J Infect Dis 2010;14(1):71-76]©Elsevier Editora Ltda.
Methicillin/Oxacillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus  
as a hospital and public health threat in Brazil
INTRODUCTION
Staphylococcus aureus has been recognized 
as an important pathogen associated with 
inpatients and community infections.1 As 
soon as methicillin was marketed in 1960, 
resistant isolates were reported after the 
screening of clinical isolates in England.2 
By 1967 MRSA was reported from Switzer-
land, France, Denmark, Australia and India3 
and mainly in the early 1980s multidrug-
resistant MRSA was reported from several 
countries4 and now is currently endemic in 
various hospitals worldwide,5 mainly in de-
veloping countries as Brazil.6,7
Many studies have identified MRSA strains 
that appear to be well adapted to the hospital 
environment8 frequently isolated from bac-
teremia, wound infections and pneumonia.1 
Risk factors for the acquisition of hospital 
infection caused by this MRSA comprehend: 
indwelling devices, prolonged hospitalization, 
and long-term antibiotic use. MRSA transmis-
sion occurs via person-to-person spread by 
healthcare staff hands and via environment-
to-patient spread.1
In 1993, novel MRSA strains were reported 
from Indigenous Australian patients who had 
not been previously exposed to the health-care 
system.9 Community-associated methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (CA-MRSA) 
has emerged worldwide during 80’s and has 
been described as an endemic pathogen in USA, 
Europe and Australia. These genuine commu-
nity acquired MRSA strains, which were trans-
mitted in the community and differed from 
conventional endemic nosocomially acquired 
MRSA strains in several ways,1 including: they 
were more susceptible to antibiotic classes 
other than β-lactam antibiotics,10 their geno-
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types were not the same as isolates from hospitals,11 they 
mainly harbored different methicillin-resistance cassettes,12 
and finally, community isolates were more likely do encode 
a putative virulence factor called Panton-Valentine leukoci-
din.13 In general, CA-MRSA is more virulent compared to 
HA-MRSA due to presence of various virulence factors.14,15
Even since this recognition, community acquired MRSA 
has been isolated from children and adults with skin and soft 
tissue infections, septic arthritis, bacteremia, toxic shock syn-
drome, necrotizing fasciitis, and necrotizing pneumonia.16,17 
It has been reported most often from indigenous popula-
tions, homeless people, jailed inmates, military recruits, chil-
dren in day care centers and competitors athletes.18 Com-
mon to all these groups is a high intensity physical contact 
which might help with transmission.1
Not unexpectedly, community-acquired MRSA has also 
found its way into hospitals where outbreaks have been re-
ported19 but most of these infections were restricted to pa-
tients with frequent contact with health facilities, such as 
residents of long-term care facilities and intravenous-drug 
users.20 Several recent reports have described the transmission 
of this pathogen establishing a new nosocomial risk witch 
needs to be considered by infection control professionals.1 
The first reported cases in Brazil, were in the Hospital das 
Clínicas of University of São Paulo, involving bloodstream 
infections caused by non-multiresistant oxacillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus, SCCmec IV.21 The emergence in Brazil 
of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus isolates carry-
ing SCCmec IV, genetically related to the USA800 clone, was 
reported by Miranda et al. (2007)22 in hospitals in two cities, 
without considerations about the patients / medical records 
evidence of risk factors. Recently, the same group23 reported 
that some of these isolates (5/13, 32.8%) were characterized 
as CA-MRSA both by molecular characteristics and clinical 
origin, including outpatients who had not been hospital-
ized. Using gentamicin, chloramphenicol, rifampicin and 
trimethoprim-sulphamethoxazole as a phenotypic marker 
was reported by us,24 with only 13.6% of the MRSA infec-
tions were classified epidemiologically “as CA-MRSA infec-
tions” in 24 patients with medical record evidence of risk 
factors as invasive devices and hospitalization. CA-MRSA 
in the absence of classic risk factors for MRSA diseases has 
also been reported by Ribeiro et al. (2007)25 with the pres-
ence of international CA-MRSA clones in Rio de Janeiro and 
Porto Alegre encoding PVL genes. CA-MRSA SCCmec IV as 
cause of infection in hospitalized patients was also reported 
by Reinert et al. (2008)26 in three out 50 nosocomial strains 
obtained from a previous study in São Paulo.
Since the 90s, virulent community-associated MRSA 
(CA-MRSA) clones, spread worldwide, first in the com-
munity, but later also in healthcare facilities. At the mo-
ment, the restriction between CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA 
is beginning to fade.27,28
Worldwide and Brazilian burden of HA-MRSA
Presently, MRSA is the most commonly identified antibiot-
ic-resistant pathogen in many parts of the world, including 
Europe, the Americas, North Africa, the Middle East and 
East Asia. It is a common hospital pathogen and cause severe 
infections in which its multiple antibiotic resistance is a seri-
ous complication.25 MRSA rates have been increasing world-
wide over the past decades, as data from continuing surveil-
lance initiatives such as the National Nosocomial infection 
Surveillance System and European Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance System.29,30 It was observed that MRSA preva-
lence was 23% in Australia, 67% in Japan, 40% in South Pa-
cific, 32% in USA, and 26% in Europe.31 A limited number 
of MRSA clones are disseminating worldwide each of them 
with a specific genetic background and SCCmec type.32
There is evidence that hospital-acquired MRSA infec-
tion increases morbidity, mortality risk and costs.33 In Brazil, 
data from the first five years of SENTRY Antimicrobial Sur-
veillance Program6 MRSA correspond to 56% of nosocomial 
and community infections evaluated and was the most com-
mon among prevalent pathogens.
According to data from Hospital de Clínicas from Fed-
eral University of Uberlândia MRSA correspond to 63.7% of 
blood infection, 100% of urinary tract infection and 46.7% 
of Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia (VAP) caused by Sta-
phylococcus aureus.7 Moreira e Gontijo Filho (2008)34 re-
searching the VAP’s etiology in the adult critical care unit of 
the same hospital reported 41.2% of S. aureus isolates with 
41.2% of MRSA.
Resistance determinants and Staphylococcal  
Cassettes Chromosome mec (SCCmec)
The understanding of the evolution of MRSA has benefited 
from the development of molecular methods that provide 
characterization of both the strain phylogeny and the me-
thicillin-resistance determinant. Consistent molecular epide-
miological evidence supports the view that the evolution of 
MRSA and of S. aureus as a species is predominantly clonal, 
but as in others organisms horizontal transfer of DNA from 
other strains or species occurs and plays an important part in 
resistance acquisition in S. aureus and is brought about mainly 
by insertion of insertion sequences, transposons, prophages, 
and incompletely understood events.35 MRSA originates from 
the introduction of a large mobile genetic element called SC-
Cmec into a methicillin-susceptible S. aureus strain.36
The mecA gene which encodes an additional pen-
icillin-binding protein (PPP2A) with reduced affinity 
of β-lactam antibiotics is located on a mobile genomic 
island, called Staphylococcal cassette chromosome mec 
(SCCmec).37 At the moment seven main types of SCCmec 
(type I to VII) are recognized. Types IV, V, VI and VII, 
cause only b-lactam antibiotic resistance while SCCmec 
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I, II and III cause resistance to multiple classes of antibi-
otic, due to additional drug resistance genes integrated into 
SCCmec, i.e. integrated plasmids and transposons.38 For its 
mobilizations SCCmec carries specific genes designated cas-
sette chromosome recombinases (ccrA, ccrB or ccrC).39 The 
Brazilian/Hungarian clone correspond to SCCmec III, ST 
239 and MLST profile 2-3-1-1-4-4-3.40
Origins, reservoirs and distribution of SCCmec types
There are several lines of evidence about the origin of 
SCCmec but is know that methicillin resistance is highly 
prevalent in S. epidermidis isolates (over 70%) and less 
common in S. aureus suggesting that S. epidermidis is the 
reservoir for SCCmec.40
Health-care associated and community-acquired MRSA 
strains have been proved genetically distinct with respect to 
the SCCmec type they contain, and most health-care associ-
ated MRSA strains carry one of three types of SCCmec (type 
I, II, or III).8 whereas most community-acquired MRSA 
strains carry mainly SCCmec type IV. Type V has also been 
identified in community-acquired MRSA isolates.11 The ex-
treme heterogeneity of the genetic backgrounds in commu-
nity-acquired MRSA strains and the small size of SCCmec 
types IV and V suggests that these SCCmec allotypes are 
more readily transmissible between staphylococci than the 
larger SCCmec types and, once introduced do no compro-
mise the fitness of the pathogen.39,41
MRSA nomenclature is currently based on the Multilocus 
Sequence Typing (ST) of fragments of seven housekeeping 
genes that refers the S. aureus lineage, resulting in an allelic 
profile designated ST, and the type of SCCmec element.32 The 
detection of divergent MRSA lineages by different molecular 
typing techniques, including Multilocus Sequence Typing 
(MLST) suggests, as previously mentioned, that MRSA have 
arisen by the introduction of SCCmec into distinct successful 
methicillin-susceptible S. aureus lineages.42,43 
It was recently reported that approximately 50% of 
MRSA isolates recovered from skin/soft tissue infections 
in the United States belonged to a CA-MRSA clone called 
USA300 (SCCmecIV, ST8, lukSF+).44 Ribeiro et al. (2007)23 
reported a diversity of clones isolated from Porto Alegre 
and Rio de Janeiro including USA300, Ocean South Pa-
cific Clone (OSPC) e USA400 corresponding to tree clonal 
complex: ST8, ST30 and ST1 respectively.
Furthermore, the larger clonal diversity of CA-MRSA com-
pared to HA-MRSA suggests that more S. aureus lineages is 
able to become CA-MRSA.45 In spite of the majority of the 
CA-MRSA isolates harbor SCCmec type IV, V or VII,46 several 
studies have also observed CA-MRSA harboring SCCmec type 
I, II or III.47 However, the majority of the studies have conclud-
ed that PVL, together with SCCmec type IV or V and specific 
genetic background, is a genetic marker for CA-MRSA.48
Until recently, it was believed that the dissemination of 
PVL-positive CA-MRSA clones was related to components, 
i.e. the ST1 and ST8 clone in USA and the ST 80 clone in Eu-
rope.49 Recent studies have shown that this observation is start-
ing to change. Today, five major PVL-positive CA-MRSA clones 
is observed worldwide: ST1 clone is observed in Asia, Europe 
and the USA, ST30 clone in Australia, Europe and South Amer-
ica, and largest diversity of CA-MRSA clones in countries with 
numerous international exchanges, such as travel hubs.32
Control of MRSA
scReening of pAtients
Colonized and infected patients represent the most impor-
tant reservoir of MRSA in health-care facilities.50 Culture 
from body sites such as the anterior nostrils alone will iden-
tify 80% of patients colonized with MRSA.51 These patients, 
who do not have clinically evident infection but are carriers 
of MRSA, can serve as reservoirs from which the organism is 
transmitted to other patients.52 On the basis of the evidence 
available, several published guidelines have recommended 
screening of inpatients at high risk of carrying MRSA, as 
those admitted to intensive-care-wards.53
isolAtion And BARRieR nuRsing
Patients colonized or infected with MRSA should whenever 
possible be housed with other patients who have MRSA,53,54 
measure that is no realistic in Brazilian hospitals. Effective-
ness of the use of gloves and gowns to care for patients with 
MRSA has been established in epidemiological studies,55 
although there is no randomized trials supporting their 
use,56 so contact precautions are not effective in interrupting 
transmission of endemic MRSA.57
enviRonmentAl cleAning
How important are contaminated environmental surfaces as 
a reservoir for MRSA? The US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention isolation guidelines recommend that hospi-
tals have adequate procedures for routine care, cleaning, and 
disinfection of environmental surfaces frequently touched.58 
Further studies are needed to find out if thorough decon-
tamination of rooms occupied by patients with MRSA will 
affect MRSA transmission rates.57
HAnd Hygiene
Transient contamination of health-care workers` hands has 
been documented on many occasions50 and is widely be-
lieved to be the predominant method by which MRSA is 
transmitted to patients.
decolonizAtion tHeRApy
Widespread use in a hospital or long-term use of mupiroc-
in in patients should be avoided since these practices have 
been associated with emergence of mupirocin-resistant 
strains of MRSA.59,60
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However, comprehensive MRSA-control program 
that have included screening cultures to detect patients 
colonized with MRSA, use of contact precautions, ap-
propriate hand hygiene, automatic alerts of readmission 
of colonized patients, with or without decolonization of 
colonized individual, have reported success in controlling 
or reducing transmission of MRSA nationally, regionally, 
and institutionally.52
CONCLUSIONS
Guidelines have suggested that alternatives to β-lactams an-
tibiotics be used as empirical therapy for patients presenting 
with SSTIs in areas were the prevalence of CA-MRSA ex-
ceeds 10 to 15%.61 However, β-lactams antibiotics continue 
to be prescribed empirically to a great proportion of patients 
who have an infection with CA-MRSA.62 Although some 
studies have found that the use of an inactive antimicrobial 
regimen for CA-MRSA infection is not necessarily associ-
ated with adverse outcomes, more-recent data suggest that 
there is a difference in clinical cure rates based on adequacy 
of the antibiotic prescribed.63
The present success of the few pandemic hospital-
acquired-MRSA clones has been accounted for by the ac-
quisition of additional fitness traits by already widespread 
and successful colonizing strains, with the view that gaining 
β-lactam resistance yields a decisive advantage over com-
petitors in hospitals.8 Because of the higher pathogenicity of 
community strains, community acquired MRSA in hospitals 
could change its predominantly opportunistic behavior and 
cause infections in patients who are no seriously ill or even 
in health-care workers.64 The recently published genome 
sequence of another very successful clone of community-
acquired MRSA, USA300, lends further support to the the-
ory that successive genomic alterations led to the evolution 
of fitter clones that combine antimicrobial resistance with 
transmissibility and virulence.65 In spite that is often thought 
that CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA belong to different lineages 
within a geographic area, and the proportion of CA-MRSA 
is an increasing trend there is also evidences that the distinc-
tion between these two organisms is beginning to fade. If the 
new community-acquired MRSA clones are, however, suf-
ficiently fit to sustain endemic levels by transmission in the 
community, the MRSA situation in hospitals still remains 
out of control in many countries as Brazil and could poten-
tially become explosive.
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